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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper provides evidence of a turn of the year effect in the order flow imbalance of both retail and 
institutional investors. In December there is net selling pressure which is reversed in January. We 
examine high frequency intraday order flow information and find that the changes in order flow 
imbalance between December and January are related to firm risk factors and characteristics. We find 
that retail order flow imbalances are associated with a wide range of risk characteristics including beta, 
illiquidity and unsystematic risk. Imbalances in institutional order flow are associated with only a small 
number of risk variables. We show that these order flow changes are important because risk premiums 
are elevated in January. Our results are robust to the effects of decimalization.  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to show that there is a turn of the year seasonality associated 
with aggregate order flow imbalance so that in December there is net selling pressure but in 
January net buying pressure. We find that this seasonality is also reflected in the order flow 
of retail and institutional investors. We use the Institute for the Study of Security Markets 
(ISSM) and Trade and Quotes (TAQ) database to examine high frequency intraday order 
flow and show that there are order flow shifts associated with the risk factors and 
characteristics of firms commonly used in asset pricing models at the turn of the year. 
Moreover, these order flow shifts are found to be present even after controlling for firm size 
and tax loss trading incentives which are known to influence year end trading activity. Since 
there is growing evidence that retail and institutional order flow may have diverse effects on 
returns and these different types of investors may be motivated to trade for different reasons 
we examine separately the effect of retail and institutional order flow. We find that the turn 
of the year order imbalance of retail investors is related to order flow shifts associated with a 
wide range of risk factors and characteristics. However, institutional order flow changes are 
associated with relatively few measures of risk.  
Our study of order flow at the turn of the year is motivated by the growing literature 
that highlights the importance of order flow imbalance. As shown by Kyle (1985) the 
interaction of informed and liquidity traders causes order flow to change in response to new 
information and provides a link between order flow changes and prices. However, even 
without information trading order flow can affect prices. Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll 
(1983) have shown that inventory adjustments arising from order flow changes lead dealers 
to adjust prices,  while Scholes (1972) has shown that when investors do not have perfectly 
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elastic demand curves changes in order flow lead to price changes so that the market can 
clear.  
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) use a principal components model to extract common 
components from order flow information and show that these are correlated with market 
returns but firm level returns are primarily influenced by their own order flow. Chordia et al 
(2001) demonstrate that order flow imbalances associated with S&P 500 securities are 
associated with changes in the market return. Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) have 
shown that daily security returns are influenced by security level order imbalances and 
provide a theoretical model in support of such a relationship.  
The relationship between order flow and returns is well established but much less is 
known about what leads to order flow changes. Ritter (1988) showed that stock buy-sell 
ratios of individual investors are lower in December and higher in January.  Keim (1989) 
noted an increase in selling pressure at the end of the tax year, which D’Mello et al (2003) 
find associated with the propensity to tax loss trade.  Ng and Wang (2004) showed that 
institutions sell more loser stocks during the last quarter of the year and buy more small 
stocks, both winners and losers in the first quarter. More recently Chordia et al (2007) has 
studied order imbalance in cross-section and found evidence of day of the week effects and a 
positive relationship between past market returns and order flow imbalance. We extend this 
knowledge by examining how the risk features of a firm influence turn of the year order flow 
imbalance, an issue not previously studied.  
We are motivated to examine institutional and retail order flow separately because 
existing evidence suggests a distinct relationship exists between retail and institutional order 
flow and returns. Klemkosky (1977) showed that quarterly institutional trading imbalances 
are positively associated with contemporaneous abnormal returns. Kraus and Stoll (1972) and 
Mikkelson and Partch (1985) show that block trades initiated by institutional traders lead to 
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significant price changes as the market absorbs the shift in order flow. More recently, in their 
cross-section analysis of trading by institutional and retail investors, Griffin, Harris and 
Topaloglu (2003) find a strong relationship between contemporaneous changes in 
institutional ownership and daily stock returns. Although most attention has been placed on 
studying institutional order flow,  Barber, Odean and Zhu (2008),  Kaniel et al (2008) and 
Kelley and Tetlock (2013) have all shown recently that retail order flow influences returns. 
Moreover a separate examination of retail and institutional traders is motivated by 
recent evidence that suggests that retail and institutional investors engage in trading for 
different reasons. There is increasing evidence that large price movements associated with 
institutional order flow are caused by herding activity, which causes trading in the same 
direction over time and larger order imbalances that would otherwise be evident, see for 
example, Wemers (1999) and Nofsinger and Sias (1999). A range of studies have shown that 
institutional investors earn higher returns than individual investors which suggests that 
informed trading is more closely associated with institutional trades. Barber, Odean and Zhu 
(2008) show that order imbalances of individual traders are highly correlated and indicative 
of herding. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) show that although herding activity is undertaken by 
individual investors their actions have less price impact than herding by institutions. Kumar 
and Lee (2006) uses trading records of individual investors to show that buying activity in 
one stock is positively correlated with buying activity in another so that the trades of 
individuals are systematically correlated.  
In our study, we use the ratio of buyer initiated trades to seller initiated trades as our 
measure of order flow imbalance and show that there is systematic selling pressure in 
December but a reversal of this pattern in January. This feature is strongest for retail order 
flow but is also evident in institutional order flow. We show that during December, average 
buy-sell ratios decline reaching their lowest point at the very end of December. They then 
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rise substantially during the first or second day of January. Between the last days of 
December and the first few days of January, increases in the average buy-sell ratio are largest 
for small loser firms but a weaker rise is also evident for winner firms. These patterns are 
particularly noticeable when examining the order flow of retail traders. The analysis of these 
daily levels of order imbalance explains why the turn of the year return seasonality exists and 
why risk premiums are elevated in January. 
We are also the first to show that increases in the ratio of buyer initiated trades to 
seller initiated trades, evident when comparing December and January, are influenced by a 
wide range of firm risk factors and characteristics. In particular,  at the end of December, 
firms that are liquid, have high market beta, high levels of unsystematic risk, or both, face a 
sharp rise in selling pressure, a pattern that is reversed during the first few days of January.  
We formally test the statistical significance of our order flow analysis by estimating a 
series of fixed effects regression models with interaction dummy variables to isolate the 
impact of a wide range of risk variables on turn of the year changes in order flow imbalance. 
The results of these regressions confirm that December to January changes in order flow 
imbalance are strongly associated with risk variables. For retail trades in winner and loser 
firms, changes in order flow imbalance are associated with a wide range of risk factors and 
characteristics but December to January institutional order flow changes is focused on a 
small number of risk features.  
To show that these order flow patterns are important we apply Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
asset pricing tests to estimate the relationship between expected returns and risk variables. 
Our cross-section results indicate a January seasonality in the pricing of a wide range of risk 
characteristics and factors which closely matches the order flow shifts that take place 
between January and December.  
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Our overall results on order flow imbalance  are important if the dynamics of order 
flow imbalance are to be modelled correctly but will also be valuable to ensure a better 
understanding of order placement strategies. The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. 
In Section 2 we describe the data and methodologies we employ. Section 3 examines buying 
and selling activity from the ISSM/ TAQ database and shows that there is high selling 
pressure in December which abates in January and this activity is related to the risk factors 
and characteristics of firms. We also present the results from the fixed effects regressions. 
Section 5 examines the effects of decimalisation. Section 6 provides a summary and 
conclusion to the paper. 
2. Data and Methodology  
We use the ISSM and TAQ databases to provide tick-by-tick data for NYSE/AMEX 
stocks including transaction prices and trade quantities in addition to the history of all stock 
quotes made. On average there are about five million trades per month for stocks in our 
sample.  We infer the direction of trade by applying the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm 
which Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) have shown to be highly accurate at separating buyer 
and seller initiated trades in equity markets.  This requires comparison of the transaction 
price of each stock trade to the contemporaneous quote in the same stock to ascertain whether 
a buy or sell trade has taken place. In cases where this trade-quote comparison can not be 
undertaken, the algorithm classifies buy trades as those that take place on an uptick and sells 
as those that take place on a downtick (some trades such as those that take place at the 
opening auction cannot be classified). Using this intraday order flow information, we 
calculate the number of buyer initiated and seller initiated trades associated with each stock. 
Our monthly measure of order flow imbalance is an aggregation of buyer initiated trades to 
seller initiated trades over a calendar  month while our daily measure of order flow imbalance 
is based on a single days trading activity. We examine the period January 1983 to December 
6 
 
2008 using the ISSM database and TAQ between January 1993 and December 20081.The 
number of stocks varies each year as firms are listed/delisted or move between other 
exchanges. The average number of firms used each year is 1720; the minimum number being 
748 and the maximum 2030.  
We analyse each trade on TAQ and classify the trade as retail or institutional using 
the Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) algorithm which assigns trades below $5,000 as retail and 
those above $50,000 as institutional. Trades between $5,000 and $50,000 units cannot be 
classified effectively as both retail and institutional traders will be active within this segment. 
These cut-offs have been shown by Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) to be accurate enough not 
to cause mis-assignment problems while and has become the standard way of studying retail 
and institutional order flow, see for example, Barber et al (2008) who study the effect of 
retail traders on market returns or Ali et al (2008) who study the effect of institutional trades 
around earnings releases.  
We obtain return, volume and market value information from the 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database and utilise risk factors and characteristics shown 
recently by Hasbrouck (2009) and Asparouhova et al (2010) to be important for the 
determination of returns2. We match the market equity data for fiscal year ends in calendar 
year t-1 with returns from July of year t to June of year t+1. This ensures these variables are 
known when returns are generated. Each stock must have at least 2 years of monthly returns 
available prior to July in year t for the calculation of pre-ranking betas.  
We estimate market-wide betas by using the Fama-French (1992) two-step procedure. 
In June each year, stocks are allocated to one of twenty-five portfolios formed from 
independent quintile rankings of size and then individual stock beta estimates (we use 
                                                          
1 We begin in 1983 as ISSM data is first available from this date.  
2 Since order imbalance influences returns we are guided to choose risk factors that are most important for return 
determination. 
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between two and five years of prior data, as available, to estimate betas). Monthly percentage 
portfolio returns are created as the cross-section average of constituent stock returns above 
the risk free rate. Portfolio betas are estimated using time-series regressions of portfolio 
returns on the overall market return, the Fama-French HML, SMB, RMW and CMA factors, 
see Fama and French (1993,1995,2015)3 . Since Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) provide 
evidence that systematic illiquidity risk generates a risk premium we also include a market-
wide measure of illiquidity risk. Data on market returns and returns to the Fama and French 
(1993, 2015) HML, SMB, RMA and CMA4 risk factors are obtained from Kenneth French’s 
website. Our measure of market-wide illiquidity is the innovation variables (ps_innov) based 
on equation (8) of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, p.652), that captures a stocks sensitivity to 
fluctuations in aggregate liquidity. The resulting full-period post rank beta estimates for a 
portfolio are assigned to each stock contained in that portfolio. βrm is the market beta,  
βSMB,  βHML, βRMW and βCMW are the betas on the Fama-French  factors,   βPS is the beta 
on the Pastor-Stambaugh systematic illiquidity factor, 
 To capture the impact of the small firm premium, shown by Roll (1983) to accrue in 
January, we incorporate the logarithm of firm size (SIZE), calculated using market 
capitalization information from the previous year end. In recognition of the pricing of 
unsystematic risk noted by Fama and MacBeth (1973), Tinic and West (1986) and Ang et al 
(2006) we also include the standard deviation of residual returns obtained from the market 
model used to estimate portfolio betas (Unsyst). To test for parameter nonlinearities between 
market risk and expected return, found to be important by both Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
and Tinic and West (1986), we also include the square of the market beta (βrm2) 
                                                          
3 In their 2015 they show that the addition of profitability and investment factors to the three factor model 
enhances its power to explain cross-sectional returns. They also show that the HML becomes a redundant factor.  
4 The factor RMW is the difference between the returns of diversified portfolios of stocks with high and low 
profitability. The factor CMA is the difference between the return to diversified portfolios with low and high 
investment returns. 
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To reflect developments in the association between liquidity and expected return, we 
employ the standardised illiquidity ratio (Illiq) of Amihud (2002). This is measured as the 
previous year’s annual average of the daily absolute return to volume ratio for a stock, 
multiplied by 106 and scaled by the market-wide average of this ratio across available stocks 
in that year. In common with Amihud (2002) and later applications that utilize the illiquidity 
ratio, we exclude from the sample both days of zero volume and any stocks in any year when 
return or volume data is available for less than 200 days.  
To capture the combined effects of tax loss trading and window dressing which 
predicts that losers are sold in December we include the capital change achieved by firms in 
the previous tax year5 as a variable (CAPΔ). This is measured in the same way as Sias and 
Starks (1997) by using the change in value that arises between January and the last day of 
November. Since liquid stocks are cheaper to sell quickly the relationship between the size of 
the capital change and return may depend upon a firm’s illiquidity so we include the variable 
CAPΔ*illiq which is the interaction of the capital change with illiquidity. Since there are 
greater incentives to tax loss trade and window dress loser firms as shown by D’Mello et al 
(2003) we include the multiplicative dummy  CAPΔ*loser*illiq  to capture the incremental 
effect of illiquidity on firms with capital losses. This has a value of zero if a firm is a winner 
firm but has a value equal to CAPΔ*loser*illiq for losers.  
Using these variables we estimate the following cross-section time series model, 
using a fixed effects linear regression to determine if turn of the year changes in trading 
volume are associated with firm characteristics.
             
 
                                                          
5 Rozeff and Kinney (1976) Givoly and Ovadia (1983), Reinganum (1983) and Roll (1983) suggested tax loss 
trading which involves tax liable investors selling loser stocks in December to minimize their capital gains tax 
bill. Brown et al (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) suggested that institutional investors sell badly 
performing investments at the end of the calendar year to improve their profile . 
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( 
In equation (1)  is the  vector cross-section of the dependent variable in 
month , where   is the number of firm observations in month t. This variable measures the 
change in monthly order flow imbalance. We estimate the model three times allowing the 
change in order flow imbalance to be the monthly change in the number of buyer initiated 
trades relative to all trades, equivalent to the monthly change in the probability of a buyer 
initiated trade taking place, and the change in monthly seller initiated trades relative to all 
trades, equivalent to the change in the probability that a sell trade will take place. Our third 
measure is the change in the ratio of monthly buyer initiated trades scaled by shares 
outstanding to monthly seller initiated trades scaled by shares outstanding.  is the   
matrix of firm risk characteristics and factors described earlier,  is the  vector of 
coefficients (prices of risk) to be estimated. We also include an interaction dummy variable 
matrix  which is the   matrix that is a unit matrix if month t is January, but is a null 
matrix if month t is not January, and  is the vector of coefficients attached to these 
interaction dummy variables which allow us to determine if the change in turn of the year 
order flow imbalance is related to risk features. The associated   vector of disturbance 
terms is . 
To show that changes in order flow associated with risk variables is important we test 
the relationship between the return to our risk variables and January by adopting the cross-
section procedure pioneered by Fama and MacBeth (1973). Each month excess stock returns 
are regressed against these stock characteristics and the estimated betas from the market-wide 
factors and risk characteristics. The time series means of monthly regression slopes provided 
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by each of the coefficients generate standard tests of whether the components of the overall 
return premium are priced. In order to make month by month asset pricing comparisons we 
undertake the regressions using only the return information for that month as well as 
estimating samples that contain all months and all months except January.  This allows us to 
obtain a month by month estimate of the risk premium associated with each risk variable.   
3. Order Imbalance at the Turn of the Year 
 
In Table 1 we report the mean, median and standard deviation of monthly buyer 
initiated, seller initiated and unclassified trades along with traded volume information for our 
CRSP-ISSM-TAQ sample. The values reported are all normalized by share outstanding 
information obtained from CRSP. Mean total volume traded across all months is over 202% 
of shares outstanding. Buyer initiated trades represent 101.82% and seller initiated trades are 
96.51%. Comparisons with Campbell et al (2009) who examine the period 1993-2000 
indicate a substantial rise in trading activity after 20006. 
Examining January and December separately shows that trading activity in January is 
lower than in December and lower than for the average of all months that exclude January. 
Mean monthly traded volume across all stocks falls sharply in January to 184.01% of shares 
outstanding while buyer and seller initiated trades fall to 93.14% and 86.00% respectively. In 
contrast, trading activity in December is  higher than in January or the average of all other 
months, mean December trading volume is 207.00% while buying and selling activity is 
103.31% and 99.14% respectively.  
3.1 Monthly December and January Buy-Sell Ratios 
 
                                                          
6The period studied by Campbell et al (2009) was 1993-2000. When we examine this same period we find that 
traded volume and buyer and seller  initiated trades are almost identical to values reported in the Campbell study.  
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In Table 2 we report the mean monthly ratio of buyer initiated trades to seller initiated 
trades for twenty five groups sorted first by capitalization then by illiquidity. Panel (i) 
provides results for aggregate order flow, Panel (ii) for retail order flow and Panel (iii) for 
institutional order flow. Group Illiq1 contains the least illiquid stocks and group Illiq5 
contains the most illiquid stocks. The Size 1 group contains the smallest firms and the Size 5 
group contains the largest firms7. Averages are reported using all months, all months except 
January and for January and December separately. A value above (below) unity arises when 
buyer initiated (seller initiated) trades exceed seller initiated (buyer initiated) trades giving 
rise to buying (selling) pressure. The all month sample indicates that the average buy-sell 
ratios of all Illiq1 to Illiq3 groups are below unity but above unity for almost all Illiq4 and 
Illiq5 suggesting that liquid stocks are in general characterized by less buying pressure8.  
Panel (i) shows that average December buy-sell ratios are depressed relative to 
January. For example, during December the mean buy-sell ratio of the small size-low 
illiquidity firms is 0.7922 rising to 0.9980 in January. We also find that December selling 
pressure diminishes for each size group as firms become more illiquid. Despite low buy-sell 
ratios for liquid stocks the December buy-sell ratio of the smallest but most illiquid firms is 
0.9698 suggesting that buyer and seller trades are almost balanced. For large firms (those in 
Size 5) there is no evidence of selling pressure in December as the mean buy-sell ratios of all 
illiquidity groups are above unity and higher than their January values. Figure 1 provides a 
visual representation of the changes in the buy-sell ratio that arise between December and 
January for the five groupings showing a large increase in the mean buy-sell ratio of small 
firms between December and January. Panel (ii) shows that for retail trades the average 
December buy-sell ratio are lower than for January and the December-January differences are 
                                                          
7 We separately examine firms based on firm size because tax loss trading has been shown to be more prevalent in 
smaller stocks while liquidity will determine how easy it is to sell at the end of the year. 
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largest for small firms. Panel (ii) shows that December-January differences in institutional 
order flow imbalance are much smaller than evident in retail order flow. 
3.2 Daily December and January Buy-Sell Ratios by Risk Characteristic  
 
Motivated by these striking patterns associated with order flow imbalance, we 
examine the ratio of buy trades to sell trades during the last twenty days of December and 
first twenty days of January for stocks sorted on the basis of each risk characteristic9. We first 
examine the buy-sell ratios of five groups sorted by firm size. These are presented in 
separately Figure 2(i) for loser firms and in Figure 2(ii) for winner firms. Panel (i) indicates 
that at the start of December there is selling pressure for the small firm group but buying 
pressure for the large firm group. During December there is a decline in the average buy-sell 
ratio of each group which is sharpest at the very end of December. On the first day of January 
the buy-sell ratio rises sharply. These changes increase in magnitude as the size of firms in 
the grouping falls. Panel (ii) indicates that this turn of the year pattern is weaker for winner 
firms but is nevertheless observable.  
We next divide the sample of firms in each size group into five further divisions 
based on the size of risk variables. For brevity in Figure 5 panels we plot the average buy-sell 
ratio for the four extreme coordinates of the twenty five portfolios, i.e. the highest and lowest 
risk groups for the smallest and largest capitalization quintile10. Overall our results show that 
for loser firms there is a decline in buy-sell ratios during December followed by a sharp rise 
in the buy-sell ratio in early January. These patterns are found to be linked to the size of some 
risk characteristics and factors.  
                                                          
9 As shares outstanding is only observed monthly, these plots present the average of buyer initiated trades to seller 
initiated trades without being scaled by shares outstanding. 
10 We only trace out the extreme size and risk groups for brevity as information on all twenty five groups is too 
great to be displayed. However, these fewer examples are sufficient to demonstrate that for each risk characteristic 
there is year end selling and January buying pressure for loser firms which is much reduced but not entirely absent 
for winner firms.  
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In Panel A of Figure 3 we present plots of turn of the year average buy-sell ratios for 
small-liquid and small-illiquid firms and for large-liquid and large-illiquid firms. Panel (i) 
and (ii) refers to plots for loser and winner firms respectively. Panel A(i) indicates that for 
loser firms throughout most of December the buy-sell ratio of the small firm-high liquidity 
group is below 0.8, falling to 0.53 on the last day of December before rising sharply to 
1.1417 on the first day of January. The average buy-sell ratio of the small firm-high 
illiquidity group declines to 0.7710 two days before the end of December rising to 1.1684 on 
day two of January. For larger firms the reversal in the buy-sell ratio is more modest. 
Consideration of Panel A(ii) suggests that even for the winner firms there are turn of the year 
changes in order flow imbalance.  
Panels B (i) and (ii) contain the December-January plots for small and large firm 
groups of high and low beta firms11 which shows that market risk is associated with order 
flow shifts between December and January. Panel (i) shows that for loser firms between the 
last day of December and the first day of January the buy-sell ratios of the small firm-large 
beta group rise from 0.5772 to 1.2095, a smaller change is evident for the small firm low beta 
group as the ratios change from 0.8696 to 1.1799. For the large firm- small beta group the 
order flow imbalance seems unrelated to the turn of the year but for the large firm-large beta 
group there is a slight rise in the buy-sell ratio between December and January. December 
average buy-sell ratios for winner firms are higher during December than for loser stocks, 
however these ratios fall towards the end of December for large beta groups.   
Panels C(i) and (ii) plot average buy-sell ratios for the SMB beta, panels D(i) and (ii) 
for the HML beta, panels E(i) and (ii) for the RMW beta, panels F (i) and (ii) for the CMA 
beta and panels G(i) and (ii) for the PS beta and show smaller shifts in order flow imbalance 
than was evident for market beta at the turn of the year. Panels H(i) and (ii) show plots for 
                                                          
11 The (β2rm) parameter provides identical plots as beta and beta squared provides identical rankings.  
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unsystematic risk and indicates large shifts in the order flow of firms with high unsystematic 
risk between December and January. The small firm-large unsystematic risk group 
experiences a rise in the buy-sell ratio from 0.6485 to 1.1250 at the turn of the year and the 
small firm-small unsystematic risk group experiences a rise from 0.7346 to 1.0367. Smaller 
changes to turn of the year buy-sell ratios are also associated with the unsystematic risk of 
large firms. For winner firms at the end of December there is a drop in the buy-sell ratio is 
followed by a January rise.  
In Figure 4 we present plots of the buy-sell ratio using retail order flow information 
for five size formed groups and in Figure 5 the buy-sell ratio calculated from institutional 
order flow information is shown for five size based groups. Figure 4 shows a large reduction 
in the buy-sell ratio of each group at the end of December which is reversed at the beginning 
of January. This reversal in order flow is largest for loser firms but also apparent in winner 
firms. Figure 5 shows that there is a weaker and less obvious change in institutional order 
flow between December and January for losers but a more noticeable change in order flow 
for winners.  
The December-January plots highlight a range of new contributions. During 
December, average buy-sell ratios of small firms are lower than for large firms but rise 
substantially during January. Between the last days of December and the first few days of 
January increases in the average buy-sell ratio are strongest for small firms that are losers but 
a weaker tendency for the average buy-sell ratio to rise at the turn of the year is also evident 
for winner firms and for large firms. This suggests that the turn of the year changes in order 
flow imbalance can not be fully explained by tax-loss trading or window dressing. We also 
show that the size of the December decline in the buy-sell ratio is related to the size of some 
risk characteristics and factors, in particular the market beta, illiquidity and unsystematic risk. 
In January this selling activity is reversed.  
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3.3 Fixed Effects Regressions of Risk Characteristics on Order Flow Imbalance.  
 
In Table 3 we present results from the estimation of our fixed effect regressions 
outlined by equation (1) which shows that even after controlling for firm size and other 
variables we still find evidence of order flow imbalance associated with risk variables. Panel 
(i) presents results for aggregate order flow, Panel (ii) for retail order flow and Panel (iii) for 
institutional order flow. Panel A presents results for all firms, Panel B for loser firms and 
Panel C for winner firms.  In these panels the first set of coefficients capture the relationship 
between changes in monthly order flow imbalance and risk characteristics and factors, while 
the second set of coefficients capture the incremental impact of these risk variables.  
 Panel A(i)  shows that on average across all months there is a positive association 
between size and monthly changes in buying activity (ratio of buy trades to all trades). This 
means that an important determinant of net buying activity is firm size. However, this is the 
only risk variable that has a month by month effect on buying activity and therefore order 
imbalance. The turn of the year interaction variables indicate that a wide range of risk 
characteristics influence changes in order imbalance between December and January. 
Illiquidity, size, βrm2, βSMB, βRMW and βPS are all negatively signed suggesting that lower 
illiquidity, smaller firms, and smaller SMB and RMW  betas are associated with larger 
changes to turn of the year buying activity. We also find that market betas and unsystematic 
risk are positively signed indicating that higher values are associated with greater December 
to January increases in the buy ratio. December to January changes in buying activity are 
negatively associated with ∆CAP indicating that firms with larger capital losses experience 
larger increases in buying activity at the turn of the year while CAP*Illiq reduces the 
magnitude that a negative capital gain has on activity. But when firms are losers and illiquid 
the impact of the capital loss on trading activity increases.  
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The results associated with changes in selling activity (ratio of sell trades to all trades) 
provide corroborative results as they are symmetric (but opposing in sign). Consistent results 
also arise when order flow imbalance is defined by changes in the buy-sell ratio. Panel A(ii) 
presents evidence that turn of the year changes in retail order flow imbalance are related to 
risk variables as turn of the year interaction coefficients for many of the risk characteristics 
and factors are significant. In particular, when examining buying activity the turn of the year 
interactions for illiquidity, size, the βrm2,βSMB and  βRMW factors suggest an inverse 
relationship between their values and the December-January change in buying activity. The 
market beta and unsystematic risk are positively signed and especially strong suggesting that 
in December there is an increase in selling pressure that is reversed in January for stocks with 
high betas and high unsystematic risk. We also confirm previous evidence provided by 
Hvidkjaer (2001) that suggests that the size of the capital loss may influence turn of the year 
order flow as ∆CAP is negatively signed suggesting that December-January changes in the 
buy ratio are smaller for firms that have positive capital gains and larger if firms have 
negative capital gains. Panels B(ii) and C(ii) shows that for both winners and losers turn of 
the year interaction risk variables influence changes in turn of the year buying activity.  
Panel A(iii) shows that for institutional order flow imbalance a smaller number of risk 
variables influence December-January changes in order flow as only βrm,  βSMB,  βCMA and 
size are significant at a 5% level or lower. Moreover, when we examine loser and winner 
firms separately, we find that market risk and βCMA are only significant for loser firms and 
not for winners. We also find that for winners higher  capital gains increase the change in  
December-January buying pressure but capital losses have no additional impact for losers. 
We find broadly consistent results when using the ratio of sell trades to all trades and when 
we use the buy-sell ratio.  
4.  Turn of the Year Risk Premiums 
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We next show that the shifts in order flow imbalance that we have detected, that are 
associated with the risk features of firms, are important for returns. Table 4 contains 
estimates of the risk premia on a month by month basis. The first two sets of coefficients 
report results obtained using all months, all months except January and each month 
separately12. The Fama-MacBeth regression coefficients indicate a strong seasonality in the 
relationship between risk and return as January is distinctive in pricing most risk variables 
but when January is excluded few of the risk variables are priced.  There is no risk premium 
associated with illiquidity in the “All Months” sample. However,  in January liquid firms 
earn higher returns than illiquid ones and when January is excluded there is a positive 
premium associated with illiquidity indicating a clear seasonality. Market risk and its non-
linear counterpart are positively and negatively priced respectively, both in January and in the 
“All Months” sample. The January market risk premium stands out as being particularly large 
as the January coefficient is over  eight times larger than for the   “All Months” sample.  
When January is excluded neither market risk nor the squared version is significantly priced.  
The SMB factor is not priced in January but is priced across all months. There is no 
seasonal component to the HML beta which is insignificant in January and during all months. 
The market-wide illiquidity risk factor, βPS, is positively priced in January but is negatively 
priced in the sample that excludes January. There is a seasonality in the RMW beta as it is 
unpriced across all months, positive (at a 10% level) when January is excluded but negative 
and significant during January. There is no seasonality evident for the CMA beta as this risk 
factor is negatively priced in the all months sample and when January is excluded. However, 
there is no January premium associated with the CMA beta.  Small firms earn a large 
premium in January but when January is excluded there is no size related premium. 
Unsystematic risk is negatively priced in months that exclude January, a finding consistent 
                                                          
12 In each table, t-statistics are computed using Newey-West (1987) adjustments to the standard errors to correct 
for serial-correlation of up to twelve months and heteroskedasticity. 
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with Ang et al (2006) who studied the relationship between unsystematic risk and return. 
However, in January, unsystematic risk is positively priced so that firms with larger 
unsystematic risks outperform firms with smaller unsystematic risks. 
The previous year’s capital change has a notable  influence on monthly returns. In 
January positive capital changes lead to negative returns while negative capital changes lead 
to positive returns, a pattern consistent with tax loss trading and window dressing. In the 
sample that excludes January; positive capital gains earn positive returns while negative 
capital gains earn negative returns. This is consistent with the continuation of a declining 
share price or momentum; see for example Jegedeesh and Titman (1993). The size of the 
January return associated with capital changes is not influenced by illiquidity but is 
influenced by illiquidity if firms are also losers, as loser firms that are more liquid earn a 
return premium13.  
To gauge how our results might influence investor profits we examine how December 
imbalances between buyer and seller initiated trades influence month by month risk adjusted 
returns out of sample. We estimate the risk coefficients between January 1983 and December 
2000. At the end of December 2000 we group stocks into two halves based on their 
December buy-sell ratio,  those securities with a low buy-sell ratio (higher levels of seller 
initiated trades but lower levels of buyer initiated trades) and those with a high  buy-sell ratio 
                                                          
13 To determine whether the monthly risk premium coefficients and therefore the price of risk displays seasonality, 
we also estimate the following linear regression separately for each of the coefficients from the cross section 
regressions. 
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The dependent variable, jt  is the  price of risk coefficient for each month t (t=1,2,...,12) on the j
th beta or 
characteristic in the cross section regression, (j=1,2,...,11). The explanatory variables, D2t-D12t are binary variables 
representing the months of the year, February to December. The intercept t1  captures the average values of  jt  
estimates in January and the coefficients jj 122    measure differences between the means in January and other 
months. For all significant risk variables we find that the premium is significantly different in January.   
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(higher buyer initiated trades lower seller initiated trades). We then implement a strategy to 
buy the stocks with a low  buy-sell ratio and sell the stocks with a high buy-sell ratio. We use 
the estimated risk coefficients up to December 2000 and the associated characteristics and 
factors to calculate the risk adjusted return to each stock in the following month. We then 
calculate the average abnormal return to the Low-High portfolio. Each month we roll forward 
this procedure by one month until the end of December 2008. On average January excess 
returns are 2.5% (p-value of 0.01) while the December returns are 2.2% (p-value is 0.04). We 
also find that a small part of the January excess return is reversed in February as returns   are 
-0.002. In no other month are excess returns to this strategy statistically significant. This 
result provides further confirmation of the presence of a trading related January-December 
seasonal return.  
The results we present in this section corroborate earlier work that has shown that 
during January risk premiums are elevated, a discovery first noted for market beta and 
unsystematic risk by Tinic and West (1984.1986).  Moreover, we have shown that the 
elevation of January risk features in more recent data than used previously and in asset 
pricing models that are more fully specified.   
5. The Effects of Decimalisation 
Within the period we examine, two important changes took place to the trading 
environment. On January 29, 2001 the NYSE introduced decimal pricing14 and reduced the 
minimum tick size to one per cent. These changes, coupled with the development of high 
speed telecommunications networks and interconnected trading platforms, has facilitated the 
growth of high frequency trading. The introduction of new electronic trading platforms and 
the increasing use of automation have had important effects on trading behaviour. 
                                                          
14 Decimalization actually took place in four stages. Seven stocks traded by one specialist converted to decimal 
pricing in August 2000, 57 stocks on September 25 2000, 94 stocks on December 4th and the remaining stocks 
January 29 2001.  
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Bessembinder (2003) shows that decimalisation led to a reduction in absolute and effective 
spreads which was concentrated in the most active securities. In the aftermath of 
decimalisation, Chakravarty, Van Ness and Van Ness (2005) report a shift in the nature of 
trading activity and an increase in both the number of trades and trading volume associated 
with small firm stocks. Ricker (1998), and Bacidore, Battalio and Jennings (2001) find that 
decimalisation improved NYSE liquidity but large traders used more cautious execution 
strategies as automation increased.  
The use of algorithmic trading to make trading decisions such as order submission, 
execution and cancellation has grown since the 1990’s but has seen its greatest rise since 
decimalisation.  By 2009 high frequency trading accounted for 79% of trading volume in the 
US. Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld  (2011) find that in normal market conditions high 
frequency trading increases liquidity and reduces spreads15 on the NYSE.  Menkveld (2013) 
has shown that the introduction of a single high frequency trader on Chi-X reduced spreads in 
Dutch stocks. Broggard (2011) also found that high frequency trading reduced spreads but 
noted that spread reductions were more prevalent in large stocks. Angel, Harris and Spatt 
(2010) have shown that the average trade size has fallen from 700 shares in 2004 to about 
300 shares in 2009. This is consistent with institutional investors making greater use of 
algorithms to break up large positions. 
We estimate the panel regressions again for the periods 1983-2000 and 2001-2008 
which equates to pre and post decimalisation periods. We do not provide the results for 
brevity16. The results show that recent changes in trading patterns have influenced the 
relationship between the changes in monthly order flow and risk characteristics. However, 
our key discovery that there are order flow changes associated with the risk features of firms 
                                                          
15 Although evidence is accumulating that high frequency trading can trigger “liquidity black-holes” and 
contribute to sell offs. 
16 The results are available on request from the authors.  
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remains robust. After decimalisation risk measures are still significant, displaying the same 
signs as during the period 1983-2000, although the strength of the relationship appears to be 
slightly weaker. In the period 1983-2000 for loser stocks there is risk shifting across a wide 
range of variables at the turn of the year but this diminishes in the post decimalisation period.  
For winners comparisons of the pre and post decimalisation periods are more similar. In 
particular, as well as beta and unsystematic risk being sources of risk shifting activity for 
winners, in the 2001-2008 period being small still has an important influence over changes in 
buying activity between December and January.  
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Our pioneering longitudinal study uses high frequency trading information to show 
that a turn of the year effect exists in order flow imbalance that can be linked to shifts in 
order flow associated with the risk characteristics of firms. By using the ratio of buyer 
initiated trades to seller initiated trades, a measure of relative buying and selling pressure, we 
show that buy-sell ratios are depressed at the end of the year and rise at the start of the year. 
A pattern that is stronger for losers than for winner firms. This is an important discovery as 
systematic changes in order flow imbalance linked to the features of firms have not been 
previously identified.  
We use the Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) algorithm to partition retail and institutional 
trades, allowing us to discover whether these changes are caused by retail or institutional 
order flow. We find that order flow shifts associated with risk features is associated with both 
retail and institutional order flow but the nature of the association between order flow 
changes and risk features differ for retail and institutional trades.  
Our results suggest a range of future research agendas. First, since we find that the 
trading patterns of individuals are highly influential in the behaviour of overall returns it 
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seems important to examine more closely the diverse effects that retail and institutional 
traders have on return behaviour. Second, the risk shifting patterns we have discovered need 
to be examined more closely, perhaps through survey analysis of traders to gain better 
insights for why these order flow shifts occur.  
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Table 1: Average Order Flow Imbalance  
In this table we report mean, median and standard deviation (S.D) values for the CRSP-ISSM-TAQ sample firms. “Buys” refers to the 
number of monthly buy trades scaled by shares outstanding; “Sells” refers to the total number of average sell trades scaled by shares 
outstanding. “Unclassifiable” are the monthly number of unclassified trades scaled by shares outstanding. “Total volume” is monthly 
traded volume scaled by shares outstanding. 
All months 
 
All Months Except December 
 
Mean Median S.D 
  
Mean Median S.D. 
Buys 101.82% 75.42% 34.39% 
 
Buys 101.68% 75.11% 34.38% 
Sells 96.51% 71.93% 32.56% 
 
Sells 96.27% 71.57% 32.41% 
Unclassifiable 4.37% 3.17% 1.52% 
 
Unclassifiable 4.35% 3.16% 1.50% 
Total volume 202.70% 62.46% 30.24% 
 
Total volume 202.31% 71.94% 32.76% 
January                                              December 
 
Mean Median S.D. 
  
Mean Median S.D. 
Buys 93.14% 67.60% 32.28% 
 
Buys 103.31% 78.80% 34.53% 
Sells 86.00% 63.35% 29.84% 
 
Sells 99.14% 75.91% 34.14% 
Unclassifiable 4.86% 3.54% 1.65% 
 
Unclassifiable 4.56% 3.24% 1.75% 
Total volume 184.0% 64.23% 30.47% 
 
Total volume 207.00% 75.87% 33.68% 
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Table 2(i): Average Buy-Sell Ratios-Aggregate Order Flow 
In this table we report the mean buy-sell ratio for all CRSP/ISSM-TAQ listed securities. The buy- sell ratio is based on the average number of buyer initiated trades in a month scaled by shares 
outstanding to the average number of seller initiated trades per month scaled by shares outstanding. Buyer and seller initiated trades are identified by using the Lee and Ready (1993) algorithm. 
January and December panels provide buy-sell ratios for January and December separately.  “All months” is the average across all months and All months except December uses all months but not 
December to calculate the average buy-sell ratio. Groups are first sorted on the basis of size then sorted on the basis of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. Size 1 is the group containing the smallest 
firms and Size 5 is the group containing the largest firms. Illiq 1 is the group containing the most liquid firms and Illiq 5 contains the most illiquid firms. Illiq (1-5) is the difference in the buy-sell ratio 
between the least illiquid firms and the most illiquid firms. * implies significance at 10% ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level. 
All months All months except December 
  Illiq 1 2 3 4 Illiq 5 Illiq( 1-5) t-value  Illiq 1 2 3 4 Illiq 5 Illiq (1-5) t-value 
Size 1 0.9170 0.9580 0.9874 1.0522 1.0410 -0.1241 (-9.84)*** Size 1 0.9283 0.9657 0.9927 1.0585 1.0475 -0.1192 (-9.06)*** 
2 0.9697 0.9750 0.9820 1.0137 1.0537 -0.0840 (-3.76)*** 2 0.9608 0.9772 0.9813 1.0119 1.0542 -0.0935 (-5.20)*** 
3 0.9730 0.9906 0.9996 1.0142 1.0570 -0.0840 (-7.53)*** 3 0.9754 0.9918 0.9973 1.0101 1.0517 -0.0763 (-6.63)*** 
4 0.9679 0.9825 0.9965 1.0108 1.0294 -0.0615 (-8.90)*** 4 0.9689 0.9801 0.9923 1.0063 1.0247 -0.0557 (-8.14)*** 
Size 5 0.9843 0.9840 0.9913 0.9939 1.0381 -0.0538 (-1.48) Size 5 0.9813 0.9810 0.9883 0.9899 1.0360 -0.0546 (-1.38) 
ALL 0.9624 0.9780 0.9914 1.0170 1.0438 -0.0814 (-7.15)*** ALL 0.9630 0.9792 0.9904 1.0153 1.0428 -0.0798 (-6.80)*** 
January December 
  Illiq 1 2 3 4 Illiq 5 Illiq (1-5) t-value  Illiq 1 2 3 4 Illiq 5 Illiq (1-5) t-value 
Size 1 0.9980 1.0405 1.0439 1.0671 1.0722 -0.0742 (-2.40)** Size 1 0.7922 0.8725 0.9296 0.9829 0.9698 -0.1776 (-3.92)*** 
2 0.9825 0.9913 0.9894 0.9964 1.0013 -0.0188 (-0.96) 2 0.9068 0.9516 0.9900 1.0333 1.0479 -0.1411 (-3.11)*** 
3 0.9718 0.9924 0.9890 0.9744 1.0310 -0.0592 (-2.07)** 3 0.9458 0.9779 1.0247 1.0587 1.1153 -0.1695 (-3.79)*** 
4 0.9864 0.9674 0.9920 0.9977 0.9954 -0.0089 (-0.31) 4 0.9567 1.0091 1.0423 1.0603 1.0812 -0.1245 (-3.52)*** 
Size 5 0.9529 0.9610 0.9671 0.9775 1.0057 -0.0527 (-2.00) ** Size 5 1.0172 1.0169 1.0250 1.0382 1.0615 -0.0443 (-1.60) 
ALL 0.9784 0.9905 0.9963 1.0026 1.0211 0.0427 (-2.70)*** ALL 0.9560 0.9657 1.0024 1.0347 1.0551 -0.0991 (-2.17)** 
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Table 2(ii): Average Buy-Sell Ratios- Retail Order Flow 
In this table we report the mean buy-sell ratio for all CRSP/ISSM-TAQ listed securities . The buy- sell ratio is based on the average number of buyer initiated trades in a month scaled by shares 
outstanding to the average number of seller initiated trades per month scaled by shares outstanding associated with retail order flow. Buyer and seller initiated trades are identified by using the Lee 
and Ready (1993) algorithm. January and December panels provide buy-sell ratios for January and December separately.  “All months” is the average across all months and All months except 
December uses all months but not December to calculate the average buy-sell ratio. Groups are first sorted on the basis of size then sorted on the basis of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. Size 1 is 
the group containing the smallest firms and Size 5 is the group containing the largest firms. Illiq 1 is the group containing the most liquid firms and Illiq 5 contains the most illiquid firms. Illiq (1-5) is 
the difference in the buy-sell ratio between the least illiquid firms and the most illiquid firms. * implies significance at 10% ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level. 
All months All months except December 
  Illiq 1 2 3 4 Illiq 5 Illiq (1-5) t-value  Illiq 1 2 3 4 Illiq 5 Illiq (1-5) t-value 
Size 1 0.7826 0.8092 0.8220 0.8358 0.8285 -0.0458 (-5.31)*** Size 1 0.7951 0.8176 0.8300 0.8441 0.8369 -0.0418 (-4.74)*** 
2 0.8461 0.8931 0.9202 0.9444 0.9605 -0.1144 (-8.06)*** 2 0.8533 0.8954 0.9211 0.9440 0.9619 -0.1086 (-7.59)*** 
3 0.8871 0.9313 0.9485 0.9822 1.0179 -0.1308 (-8.62)*** 3 0.8922 0.9393 0.9450 0.9789 1.0130 -0.1208 (-8.43)*** 
4 0.8811 0.9399 0.9468 0.9899 1.0162 -0.1351 (-9.79)*** 4 0.8829 0.9300 0.9446 0.9873 1.0112 -0.1283 (-9.41)*** 
Size 5 0.8602 08973 0.9132 0.9404 0.9702 -0.1101 (-10.83)*** Size 5 0.8630 0.8977 0.9114 0.9387 0.9693 -0.1063 (-10.29)*** 
ALL 0.8514 0.8942 0.9101 0.9385 0.9587 -0.1072 (-9.76)*** ALL 0.8573 0.8960 0.9104 0.9386 0.9585 -0.1012 (-9.40)*** 
January December 
  Illiq 1 2 3 4 Illiq 5 Illiq (1-5) t-value  Illiq 1 2 3 4 Illiq 5 Illiq (1-5) t-value 
Size 1 0.8732 0.8947 0.8666 0.8980 0.8434 0.0298 (1.27) Size 1 0.6455 0.7176 0.7337 0.7444 0.7358 -0.0904 (-2.40)** 
2 0.8798 0.8997 0.9285 0.9523 0.9419 -0.0621 (-1.86)* 2 0.7667 0.8683 0.9104 0.9480 0.9448 -0.1781 (-2.62)*** 
3 0.9063 0.9449 0.9378 0.9686 1.0176 -0.1113 (-2.39)** 3 0.8317 0.9458 0.9868 1.0179 1.0719 -0.2402 (-2.54)** 
4 0.9049 0.9594 0.9626 0.9890 1.0162 -0.1113 (-2.73)*** 4 0.8611 0.9453 0.9710 1.0190 1.0714 -0.2103 (-2.88)*** 
Size 5 0.8786 0.8988 0.9209 0.9496 0.9750 -0.0964 (-3.24)*** Size 5 0.8290 0.8927 0.9329 0.9591 0.9802 -0.1512 (-3.28)*** 
ALL 0.8885 0.9195 0.9233 0.9515 0.9588 -0.0702 (-2.56)** ALL 0.7868 0.8740 0.9068 0.9378 0.9608 -0.1740 (-2.89)** 
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Table 2(iii): Average Buy-Sell Ratios – Institutional Order Flow 
In this table we report the mean buy-sell ratio for all trades in CRSP/ISSM-TAQ listed securities.  The buy- sell ratio is based on the average number of buyer initiated trades in a month scaled by 
shares outstanding to the average number of seller initiated trades per month scaled by shares outstanding associated with institutional order flow. Buyer and seller initiated trades are identified by 
using the Lee and Ready (1993) algorithm. January and December panels provide buy-sell ratios for January and December separately.  “All months” is the average across all months and All months 
except December uses all months but not December to calculate the average buy-sell ratio. Groups are first sorted on the basis of size then sorted on the basis of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. 
Size 1 is the group containing the smallest firms and Size 5 is the group containing the largest firms. Illiq 1 is the group containing the most liquid firms and Illiq 5 contains the most illiquid firms. Illiq 
(1-5) is the difference in the buy-sell ratio between the least illiquid firms and the most illiquid firms. * implies significance at 10% ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level. 
All months All months except December 
  Illiq 1 2 3 4 Illiq 5 Illiq (1-5) t-value  Illiq 1 2 3 4 Illiq 5 Illiq (1-5) t-value 
Size 1 0.8708 0.8642 0.8504 0.8389 0.8358 0.0350 (4.00)*** Size 1 0.8713 0.8674 0.8546 0.8403 0.8379 0.0334 (3.71)*** 
2 0.8801 0.8680 0.8577 0.8440 0.8343 0.0458 (5.31)*** 2 0.8832 0.8702 0.8616 0.8451 0.8362 0.0470 (5.12)*** 
3 0.8827 0.8818 0.8715 0.8717 0.8601 0.0226 (3.52)*** 3 0.8845 0.8837 0.8736 0.8753 0.8632 0.0214 (3.17)*** 
4 0.8812 0.8710 0.8683 0.8620 0.8600 0.0213 (3.59)*** 4 0.8843 0.8724 0.8711 0.8640 0.8627 0.0216 (3.50)*** 
Size 5 0.8237 0.8363 0.8449 0.8449 0.8530 -0.0292 (-5.20)*** Size 5 0.8260 0.8378 0.8467 0.8459 0.8543 -0.0283 (-4.93)*** 
ALL 0.8677 0.8643 0.8586 0.8523 0.8486 0.0191 (4.63)*** ALL 0.8699 0.8663 0.8615 0.8541 0.8509 0.0190 (4.44)*** 
January December 
  Illiq 1 2 3 4 Illiq 5 Illiq (1-5) t-value  Illiq 1 2 3 4 Illiq 5 Illiq (1-5) t-value 
Size 1 0.8878 0.9098 0.9108 0.8864 0.8536 0.0341 (1.11) Size 1 0.8654 0.8289 0.8041 0.8241 0.8126 0.0528 (1.46) 
2 0.9192 0.9071 0.8777 0.8671 0.8651 0.0541 (1.64) 2 0.8464 0.8446 0.8152 0.8320 0.8137 0.0328 (1.41) 
3 0.9179 0.9143 0.8871 0.8928 0.8605 0.0574 (2.15)** 3 0.8628 0.8609 0.8486 0.8320 0.8264 0.0364 (1.64) 
4 0.9298 0.9039 0.8983 0.8791 0.8855 0.0444 (1.90)* 4 0.8480 0.8552 0.8375 0.8399 0.8302 0.0178 (0.80) 
Size 5 0.8380 0.8597 0.8827 0.8901 0.8875 -0.0495 (-2.03)** Size 5 0.7988 0.8198 0.8261 0.8336 0.8388 -0.0399 (-1.59) 
ALL 0.8985 0.8990 0.8913 0.8831 0.8704 0.0281 (1.54) ALL 0.8443 0.8419 0.8263 0.8323 0.8243 0.0200 (1.27) 
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Table 3(i):Order Flow Imbalance Fixed Effects Panel Regression-Aggregate Order Flow 
This table presents the results of a panel fixed effects regression in which three measures of the change in order flow imbalance are regressed against firm risk variables and a set of January dummy 
variables, one for each risk variable. The dependent variable is the change in the number of buyer initiated trades relative to all trades, the change in seller initiated trades relative to all trades, or the 
change in the buy-sell ratio of buyer initiated trades scaled by shares outstanding to seller initiated trades scaled by shares outstanding. The results in Panel A are for all firms. Panels B and C report the 
results for loser firms and winner firms respectively. * implies significance at 10% ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level. 
  
  
January dummy variable interacting with  
  
 
Illiq Βrm βrm2 βSMB βHML βPS βRMW βCMA Size Unsyst CAPΔ CAPΔ*Illiq CAPΔ *loser*Illiq llliq βrm βrm2 βSMB βHML βPS βRMW βCMA Size Unsyst CAPΔ CAPΔ*Illiq CAPΔ *loser*Illiq Const.   
All firms Panel A   
Buy 
0.000 -0.005 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.008 0.106 -0.037 -0.033 0.012 -0.012 -0.020 0.005 -0.007 0.070 -0.005 0.004 -0019 -0.006 
  
 
(0.57) (-0.53) (0.44) (1.61) (-0.41) (0.67) (0.87) (0.85) ( 4.25)*** (-0.08) (0.17) (-0.23) (0.81) (-6.43)*** ( 9.76)*** (-5.59)*** (-6.86)*** (1.50) (-0.40) (-5.83)*** (0.92) (-15.27)*** ( 8.38)*** ( -8.12)*** (6.69)*** (-1.99)** (-1.10) 
  
Sell 
-0.000 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.009 -0.110 0.036 0.033 -0.009 -0.023 0.023 -0.10 0.007 -0.059 0.004 -0.004 0.022 0.004 
  
 
(-0.38) (0.52) (-0.35) (-1.84)* (0.49) (-0.06) (-1.40) (-0.32) (-2.57)** (-0.35) (-0.37) (0.36) ( -0.91) (6.89)*** ( -10.02)*** ( 5.47)*** ( 6.74)*** ( -1.07) ( -0.79) (6.66)*** (-2.01)** (15.16)*** (-7.02)*** (5.52)*** (5.53)*** (2.31)** (0.68) 
  
Buy-Sell 
-0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.009 -0.001 0.014 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.009 -0.032 0.312 -0.109 -0.091 0.000 -0.049 -0.069 0.003 -0.019 0.254 -0.022 0.019 -0.096 -0.038 
  
 
(-0.63) (0.03) (-0.09) (1.16) (-0.12) (0.29) (0.79) (0.57) ( 3.92)*** (0.71) (-0.32) (0.09) (0.67) ( 5.81)*** (6.39)*** (-3.72)*** (-4.19)*** (0.01) (-0.38) (-4.47)*** (0.14) (-8.95)*** ( 6.83)*** ( -7.60)*** (6.44)*** (-2.26)** (-1.61) 
  
Loser firms Panel B 
  
Buy 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.004 0.043 -0.015 -0.019 0.007 0.012 -0.017 0.001 -0.002 0.047 0.000 0.002  -0.009 
  
 
(0.08) (0.11) (- 0.02) (-0.56) (0.49) ( 0.44) (0.46) (0.77) ( 2.45)*** (-0.07) (-0.60) (0.05) 
 
(-2.91)*** ( 3.20)*** (-1.95)* (-3.19)*** (0.77) (0.34) (-4.19)*** (0.22) (-4.22)*** ( 4.46)*** (-0.26) (2.81)***  (- 1.33) 
  
Sell 
0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
0.004 -0.046 0.012 0.020 -0.006 -0.064 0.021 -0.10 0.003 -0.032 -0.001 -0.001  0.005 
  
 
( 0.22) ( 0.02) (0.03) (-0.99) (-0.12) (0.24) (-1.17) (-0.19) (-1.11) (- 0.23) (0.21) (0.14) 
 
( 3.31)*** (-3.43)*** ( 1.51) ( 3.48)*** ( -0.66) ( -1.85)* (5.23)*** (-1.69)* ( 4.60)*** (-2.98)* (-1.47) (-2.06)**  (0.79) 
  
Buy-Sell 
-0.002 0.025 -0.010 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.010 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.017 0.059 -0.024 -0.025 -0.031 0.032 -0.052 -0.008 0.000 0.182 -0.005 0.011  -0.051 
  
 
(-0.75) (0.42) ( -0.35) (0.32) ( 0.59) (0.02) (0.63) (0.44) ( 2.58)*** (0.41) (-0.24) (-0.09) 
 
(-2.84)*** ( 0.96) (-0.65) (-0.93) (-0.72) (0.20) (-2.79)*** (-0.29) (-0.07) ( 3.75)*** (-1.28) (3.38)***  ( -1.70)* 
  
Winner firms Panel C 
  
Buy 
-0.001 -0.014 0.004 0.006 -0.008 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.004 
 
-0.011 0.134 -0.039 -0.043 0.030 0.001 -0.030 0.020 -0.011 0.006 -0.040 0.014  0.000 
  
 
(-0.70) ( -0.66) (0.44) ( 1.65)* ( -1.50) (- 0.03) (1.42) (-0.36) ( 2.81)*** (0.00) (1.49) (-0.70) 
 
(-2.53)** ( 6.73)*** (-3.24)*** (-4.96)*** (2.13)** (0.01) (-4.61)*** (2.18)** ( 12.55)*** (0.41) (-9.13)*** (0.97)  (-0.01) 
  
Sell 
0.001 0.013 -0.004 -0.005 0.006 -0.002 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 
 
0.013 -0.148 0.048 0.040 -0.022 -0.002 0.030 -0.018 0.011 -0.014 0.035 -0.010  -0.001 
  
 
( 0.67) (-0.61) (-0.41) (-1.39) (1.11) (-0.09) (-1.30) (0.34) (-1.74)* ( -0.38) (-1.83)* (0.61) 
 
( 2.93)*** (-7.34)*** ( 3.96)*** ( 4.58)*** ( 1.50) ( -0.03) (4.60)*** (-1.94)* ( 12.55)*** (-0.88)* (7.91)*** (-0.68)  ( -0.11) 
  
Buy-Sell 
-0.013 -0.055 0.017 0.024 -0.028 0.019 0.014 -0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.025 
 
-0.044 0.460 -0.136 -0.153 0.094 0.018 -0.115 0.057 -0.036 0.028 -0.140 0.038  -0.003 
  
 
(-1.39) ( -0.60) ( 0.39) (1.56) ( -1.18) ( 0.19) (1.12) (-0.23) ( 2.51)** ( 0.16) (0.77) (-0.98) 
 
(-2.36)** ( 5.34)*** (-2.61)*** (-4.07)*** (1.52) (0.08) (-4.12)*** (1.44) (-9.53)*** (0.42) (-7.43)*** (0.61)  (-0.07) 
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Table 3(ii): Order Flow Imbalance Fixed Effects Panel Regression Results- Retail Order Flow 
This table presents the results of a panel fixed effects regression in which three measures of the change in order flow imbalance are regressed against firm risk variables and a set of January dummy 
variables, one for each risk variable. The dependent variable is the change in the number of buyer initiated trades relative to all trades, the change in seller initiated trades relative to all trades, or the 
change in the buy-sell ratio of buyer initiated trades scaled by shares outstanding to seller initiated trades scaled by shares outstanding. The results in Panel A are for all firms. Panels B and C report the 
results for loser firms and winner firms respectively. * implies significance at 10% ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level. 
  
  
January dummy variable interacting with  
  
 
Illiq βrm βrm2 βSMB βHML βPS βRMW βCMA Size Unsyst CAPΔ CAPΔ*Illiq CAPΔ *loser*Illiq llliq Βrm βrm2 βSMB βHML βPS βRMW βCMA Size Unsyst CAPΔ CAPΔ*Illiq CAPΔ *loser*Illiq Const.   
All firms Panel A   
Buy 
-0.001 -0.018 0.007 0.005 0.001 0.020 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.011 -0.001 0.000 0.005 -0.013 0.195 -0.065 -0.064 0.014 0.001 -0.028 0.004 -0.013 0.044 -0.004 0.006 -0.052 -0.006 
  
 
(-0.79) (-1.15) (0.92) (1.90)* (0.36) (1.20) (0.57) (0.92) (4.48)*** (2.02)** (-1.85)* (0.03) (1.07) (-6.93)*** (11.83)*** (-6.69)*** (-9.18)*** (1.22) (0.02) (-5.70)*** (0.57) (-17.14)*** (3.91)*** (-4.26)*** (6.71)*** (-3.64)*** (-0.82) 
  
Sell 
0.001 0.018 -0.007 -0.005 -0.001 -0.020 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.011 0.001 0.00 -0.005 0.013 -0.195 0.065 0.064 -0.014 -0.001 0.028 -0.004 0.013 -0.044 0.004 -0.006 0.052 0.006 
  
 
(0.79) (1.15) (-0.92) (-1.90)* (-0.36) (-1.20) (-0.57) (-0.92) (-4.48)*** (-2.02)* (1.85)* (-0.03) (-1.07) (6.93)*** (-11.83)*** (6.69)*** (-9.18)*** (-1.22) (-0.02) (5.70)*** (-0.57) (-17.14)*** (-3.91)*** (4.26)*** (-6.71)*** (3.64)*** (0.82) 
  
Buy-Sell 
-0.008 -0.046 0.018 0.016 0.011 0.084 0.002 0.013 0.006 0.072 -0.004 0.001 0.020 -0.048 0.723 -0.235 -0.245 0.032 -0.065 -0.106 0.002 -0.046 0.122 -0.009 0.023 -0.269 -0.047 
  
 
(-1.75)* (-0.63) (0.51) (1.29) (0.57) (1.07) (0.24) (1.02) (4.01)*** (2.67)*** (-2.63)*** (0.83) (0.89) (-5.14)*** (9.05)*** (-5.01)*** (-7.22)*** (0.58) (-0.31) (-4.50)*** (0.05) (12.90)*** (2.22)** (-2.01)** (5.35)*** (-3.86)*** (-1.26) 
  
Loser firms Panel B 
  
Buy 
-0.001 -0.008 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.000 
 
-0.008 0.069 -0.014 -0.047 0.026 0.084 -0.029 0.008 -0.005 0.014 0.002 0.003  -0.012 
  
 
(-0.73) (-0.40) (0.31) (1.13) (0.61) (0.39) (0.85) (0.30) (2.85)*** (1.74)* (-1.38) (-0.18) 
 
(-3.97)*** (3.17)*** (-1.10) (-5.18)*** (1.80)* (1.57) (-4.85)*** (0.86) (-4.64)*** (0.97) (1.47) (3.44)***  (-1.15) 
  
Sell 
0.001 0.008 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.012 0.000 0.000 
 
0.008 -0.069 0.014 0.047 -0.026 -0.084 0.029 -0.008 0.005 -0.014 -0.002 -0.003  0.012 
  
 
(0.73) (0.40) (-0.31) (-1.13) (-0.61) (-0.39) (-0.85) (-0.30) (-2.85)*** (-1.74) (1.38) (0.18) 
 
(3.97)*** (-3.17)*** (1.10) (5.18)*** (-1.80)* (-1.57) (4.85)*** (-0.86) (4.64)*** (-0.97) (-1.47) (-3.44)***  (1.15) 
  
Buy-Sell 
-0.007 -0.018 0.009 0.013 0.023 0.034 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.083 -0.002 0.000 
 
-0.032 0.316 -0.070 -0.192 0.064 0.026 -0.113 0.012 -0.019 0.003 0.008 0.015  -0.081 
  
 
(-1.24) (-0.18) (0.17) (0.75) (0.86) (0.32) (0.56) (0.45) (3.15)*** (2.18)** (-1.25) (0.21) 
 
(-3.08)*** (2.87)*** (-1.11) (-4.23)*** (0.88) (0.97) (-3.77)*** (0.26) (-3.71)*** (0.04) (1.51) (3.18)***  (-1.56) 
  
Winner firms Panel C 
  
Buy 
-0.002 -0.037 0.015 0.006 -0.002 0.028 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.000 
 
-0.007 0.239 -0.081 -0.067 0.012 -0.056 -0.033 0.012 -0.016 -0.001 -0.041 0.013  0.006 
  
 
(-0.55) (-1.29) (1.08) (1.28) (-0.29) (0.91) (0.64) (0.33) (2.45)** (0.46) (0.76) (-0.03) 
 
(-1.13) (8.71)*** (-4.97)*** (-5.80)*** (0.66) (-0.76) (-3.88)*** (1.00) (-13.52)*** (-0.07) (-7.31)*** (0.64)  (0.42) 
  
Sell 
0.002 0.037 -0.015 -0.006 0.002 -0.028 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 0.000 
 
0.007 -0.239 0.081 0.067 -0.012 0.056 0.033 -0.012 0.016 0.001 0.04 -0.013  -0.006 
  
 
(0.55) (1.29) (-1.08) (-1.28) (0.29)) (-0.91) (-0.64) (-0.33) (-2.45)** (-0.46) (-0.76) (0.03) 
 
(1.13) (-8.71)*** (4.97)*** (5.80)*** (-0.66) (0.76) (3.88)*** (-1.00) (13.52)*** (0.07) (7.31)*** (-0.64)  (-0.42) 
  
Buy-Sell 
-0.010 -0.120 0.045 0.024 -0.007 0.130 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.026 0.000 0.008 
 
-0.014 0.861 -0.282 -0.251 0.042 -0.260 -0.122 0.034 -0.060 0.023 -0.126 0.001  0.011 
  
 
(-0.64) (-0.91) (0.72) (1.06) (-0.20) (0.91) (0.37) (0.40) (2.10)** (0.56) (0.04) (0.19) 
 
(-0.46) (6.86)*** (-3.82)*** (-4.77)*** (0.48) (-0.77) (-3.17)*** (0.62) (-10.92)*** (0.26) (-4.95)*** (0.01)  (0.17) 
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Table 3(iii): Order Flow Imbalance Fixed Effects Panel Regression Results – Institutional Trades 
This table presents the results of a panel fixed effects regression in which three measures of the change in order flow imbalance are regressed against firm risk variables and a set of January dummy 
variables, one for each risk variable. The dependent variable is the change in the number of buyer initiated trades relative to all trades, the change in seller initiated trades relative to all trades, or the 
change in the buy-sell ratio of buyer initiated trades scaled by shares outstanding to seller initiated trades scaled by shares outstanding. The results in Panel A are for all firms. Panels B and C report the 
results for loser firms and winner firms respectively. * implies significance at 10% ** at a 5% level and *** at a 1% level. 
  
  
January dummy variable interacting with  
  
 
Illiq βrm βrm2 βSMB βHML βPS βRMW βCMA Size Unsyst CAPΔ CAPΔ*Illiq CAPΔ *loser*Illiq llliq Βrm βrm2 βSMB βHML βPS βRMW βCMA Size Unsyst CAPΔ CAPΔ*Illiq CAPΔ *loser*Illiq Const.   
All firms Panel A   
Buy 
0.008 0.015 -0.009 0.000 -0.006 -0.009 0.003 -0.004 0.000 0.009 0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 0.057 -0.023 -0.022 0.002 -0.095 0.011 -0.023 -0.003 -0.019 0.002 0.002 0.034 -0.008 
  
 
(0.99) (0.50) (-0.70) (0.12) (-0.88) (-0.48) (0.57) (-0.88) (0.59) (1.08) (1.14) (-1.14) (-0.21) (-0.12) (2.79)*** (-1.73)* (-2.53)** (0.12) (-1.77)* (1.17) (-2.07)** (-3.67)*** (-1.01) (1.23) (0.49) (0.66) (-0.45) 
  
Sell 
-0.008 -0.015 0.009 0.000 0.006 0.009 -0.003 0.004 0.000 -0.009 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.001 -0.057 0.023 0.022 -0.002 0.095 -0.011 0.023 0.003 0.019 -0.002 -0.002 -0.034 0.008 
  
 
(-0.99) (-0.50) (0.70) (-0.12) (0.88) (0.48) (-0.57) (0.88) (-0.59) (-1.08) (-1.14) (1.14) (0.21) (0.12) (-2.79)*** (1.73) (2.53)** (-0.12) (1.77)* (-1.17) (2.07)** (3.67)*** (1.01) (-1.23) (-0.49) (-0.66) (0.45) 
  
Buy-Sell 
0.036 0.045 -0.032 0.002 -0.036 -0.042 0.014 -0.020 0.002 0.040 0.002 -0.011 -0.040 -0.001 0.286 --0.129 -0.089 -0.025 -0.448 0.076 -0.122 -0.014 -0.082 0.011 0.006 0.225 -0.025 
  
 
(0.87) (0.29) (-0.49) (0.09) (-1.02) (-0.43) (0.61) (-0.92) (0.84) (0.96) (1.11) (-0.98) (-0.36) (-0.02) (2.80)*** (-1.92)* (-2.00)** (-0.31) (-1.66)* (1.69)* (-2.21)** (-3.50)*** (-0.86) (1.57) (0.33) (0.88) (-0.27) 
  
Loser firms Panel B 
  
Buy 
0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.014 0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.009 0.001 -0.002 
 
-0.001 0.065 -0.030 -0.018 -0.007 -0.087 0.012 -0.025 -0.003 0.011 -0.001 0.002  0.002 
  
 
(0.42) (-0.11) (0.05) (-0.09) (-0.44) (-0.60) (0.58) (-0.60) (-0.03) (0.87) (1.61) (-0.83) 
 
(-0.19) (2.73)*** (-1.97)** (-1.72)* (-0.40) (-1.39) (1.23) (-2.00)** (-3.08)*** (0.47) (-0.58) (0.70)  (0.08) 
  
Sell 
-0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.004 0.014 -0.003 0.003 0.000 -0.009 -0.001 0.002 
 
0.001 -0.065 0.030 0.018 0.007 0.087 -0.012 0.025 0.003 -0.011 0.001 -0.002  -0.002 
  
 
(-0.42) (0.11) (-0.05) (0.09) (0.44) (0.60) (-0.58) (0.60) (0.03) (-0.87) (-1.61) (0.83) 
 
(0.19) (-2.73)*** (1.97)** (1.72)* (0.40) (1.39) (-1.23) (2.00)** (3.08)*** (-0.47) (0.58) (-0.70)  (-0.08) 
  
Buy-Sell 
0.004 -0.034 0.012 -0.006 -0.016 -0.054 0.010 -0.012 0.000 0.039 0.004 -0.006 
 
-0.004 0.316 -0.158 -0.066 -0.071 -0.417 0.091 -0.143 -0.014 0.079 -0.004 0.010  0.014 
  
 
(0.09) (-0.19) (0.16) (-0.27) (-0.40) (-0.47) (0.39) (-0.47) (0.13) (0.76) (1.48) (-0.48) 
 
(-0.10) (2.66)*** (-2.07)** (-1.28) (-0.79) (-1.33) (1.81)* (-2.28)** (-2.84)*** (0.67) (-0.39) (0.57)  (0.13) 
  
Winner firms Panel C 
  
Buy 
0.063 0.079 -0.040 -0.003 -0.008 -0.005 0.000 -0.007 0.001 -0.009 -0.004 0.145 
 
-0.037 0.056 -0.014 -0.043 0.027 -0.105 0.004 -0.020 -0.004 -0.033 0.024 -0.142  -0.044 
  
 
(1.20) (0.78) (-0.98) (-0.30) (-0.34) (-0.10) (0.01) (-0.51) (1.28) (-0.50) (-1.25) (1.20) 
 
(-1.00) (1.37) (-0.50) (-2.38)** (0.80) (-0.98) (0.21) (-0.84) (-2.52)** (-0.84) (2.79)*** (-0.80)  (-0.71) 
  
Sell 
-0.063 -0.079 0.040 -0.003 0.008 0.005 0.000 0.007 -0.001 0.009 0.004 -0.145 
 
0.037 -0.056 -0.014 0.043 -0.027 0.105 -0.004 0.020 0.004 0.033 -0.024 0.142  0.044 
  
 
(-1.20) (-0.78) (0.98) (-0.30) (0.34) (0.10) (-0.01) (0.51) (-1.28) (0.50) (1.25) (-1.20) 
 
(1.00) (-1.37) (-0.50) (2.38)** (-0.80) (0.98) (-0.21) (0.84) (2.52)** (0.84) (-2.79)*** (0.80)  (0.71) 
  
Buy-Sell 
0.340 0.349 -0.176 -0.008 -0.055 -0.059 0.007 -0.032 0.006 -0.041 -0.021 0.758 
 
-0.171 0.316 -0.102 -0.186 0.100 -0.455 0.030 -0.089 -0.019 -0.181 0.110 -0.608  -0.201 
  
 
(1.27) (0.68) (-0.85) (-0.16) (-0.49) (-0.25) (0.08) (-0.48) (1.38) (-0.43) (-1.28) (1.23) 
 
(-0.91) (1.52) (-0.71) (-2.05)** (0.58) (-0.84) (0.30) (-0.75) (-2.56)*** (-0.91) (2.49)** (-0.67)  (-0.64) 
  
 
33 
 
Table 4: Month by Month Cross-Section Results 
Reported are the time series averages of coefficients from cross-section Fama-MacBeth regressions using monthly return data for NYSE/AMEX stocks over the period 1983-2008. The results 
for “All months” utilize each time series coefficient from the cross-section. “No January” utilizes each time series coefficient except those obtained from January. January to December are the 
time series coefficient averages obtained for each month. Reported are the coefficients from regressing against monthly returns the extended factor model that includes the Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity measure (Illiq), market beta (βrm), market beta squared (βrm2), illiquidity, the estimated beta on the Fama-French SMB factor (βSMB), and the estimated beta on the Fama-French HML 
factor (βHML), the market wide illiquidity risk factor (βps), profitability (βRMW) and investment betas(βCMA)) the logarithm of firm size (Size), the standard deviation of residual returns (Unsyst.), 
CAPΔ is the previous year’s capital change, CAPΔ*Illiq and  CAPΔ*loser*Illiq are the interaction variables with the capital change. * implies significance at 10% and ** at a 5% level and *** at a 
1% level. 
 Constant Illiq βrm βrm2 βSMB  βHML  βps  βRMW βCMA Size Unsyst. CAPΔ CAPΔ*Illiq CAPΔ*loser*Illiq 
All months 0.005 0.000 0.037 -0.016 -0.009 0.001 -0.017 0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.011 0.002 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.56) (1.40) (2.20)** (-2.01)** (-2.29)** (0.30) (-1.03) (0.67) (-2.11)** (-2.37)** (-0.78) (1.72)* (0.26) (-1.49) 
No January 0.010 0.001 0.013 -0.005 -0.004 0.000 -0.037 0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.041 0.004 -0.001 0.000 
 (1.12) (3.06)*** (0.79) (-0.70) (-1.08) (0.06) (-2.20)** (1.82)* (-1.97)** (-0.89) (-2.76)*** (3.90)*** (-0.95) (-0.18) 
January -0.052 -0.005 0.301 -0.129 -0.062 0.012 0.208 -0.032 -0.006 -0.013 0.316 -0.025 0.009 -0.029 
  (-2.14)** (-2.09)** (3.59)*** (-3.54)*** (-3.10)*** (1.01) (2.47)** (-2.97)*** (-0.85) (-3.47)*** (3.84)*** (-2.82)*** (1.49) (-2.15)** 
February -0.029 0.001 0.131 -0.051 -0.009 -0.007 -0.020 0.006 -0.002 -0.005 0.078 0.000 0.003 -0.005 
  (-1.31) (1.25) (1.99)** (-1.77)* (-0.62) (-0.56) (-0.41) (0.73) (-0.35) (-2.32)** (1.17) (0.12) (0.80) (-1.10) 
March 0.050 0.000 -0.050 0.028 -0.007 0.001 -0.089 0.014 -0.001 -0.003 0.023 0.001 0.000 -0.008 
  (1.86)* (0.15) (-0.79) (0.89) (-0.64) (0.09) (2.18)** (2.13)** (-0.12) (-1.67)* (0.89) (0.72) (-0.30) (-1.61) 
April -0.002 0.001 0.034 -0.011 -0.014 0.016 -0.003 0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.051 0.001 -0.002 0.009 
  (-0.07) (1.89)* (0.56) (-0.35) (-1.37) (1.13) (-0.06) (0.23) (-0.84) (-0.51) (-1.65) (0.41) (-1.42) (2.56)*** 
May -0.027 -0.001 0.120 -0.056 0.002 -0.021 -0.024 0.008 -0.015 0.000 0.011 -0.002 0.001 -0.006 
  (-1.39) (-1.34) (2.74)*** (-2.67)*** (0.18) (-1.57) (-0.52) (0.90) (-1.49) (-0.19) (0.31) (-0.53) (1.01) (-1.44) 
June 0.048 -0.000 -0.029 0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.079 0.014 -0.018 -0.003 -0.078 0.005 0.002 -0.004 
 (2.02)** (-0.40) (-0.71) (0.21) (0.05) (-0.11) (-1.94)* (2.48)** (-3.09)*** (-2.49)** (-2.12)** (1.54) (1.35) (-1.03) 
July -0.010 0.001 0.024 -0.008 -0.026 0.044 0.172 -0.022 0.021 0.000 -0.111 0.004 0.002 -0.012 
  (-0.35) (1.14) (0.48) (-0.33) (-2.64)*** (3.32)*** (3.14)*** (-3.17)*** (2.76)*** (-0.05) (-3.04)*** (1.32) (0.98) (-2.10)** 
August 0.031 0.002 -0.021 0.005 0.002 -0.021 -0.149 0.009 -0.016 0.000 -0.048 0.004 -0.005 0.008 
  (1.35) (1.83)* (-0.50) (0.24) (0.16) (-1.81)* (-3.49)*** (1.43) (-1.67)* (0.16) (-1.41) (0.90) (-1.33) (1.12) 
September 0.012 0.001 -0.035 0.006 -0.007 0.024 -0.061 -0.004 0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.005 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.62) (1.74)* (-0.84) (0.33) (-0.93) (2.03)** (-1.27) (-0.59) (0.45) (0.49) (-0.10) (1.94)* (-0.22) (-0.20) 
October -0.028 0.003 0.010 -0.010 0.010 -0.015 -0.034 -0.007 0.002 0.005 -0.080 0.010 -0.003 0.004 
  (-1.11) (2.25)** (0.18) (-0.43) (0.72) (-0.58) (-0.71) (-0.76) (0.21) (3.59)*** (-1.52) (2.81)*** (-1.16) (0.76) 
November 0.030 0.001 0.001 0.010 -0.013 -0.009 -0.018 0.009 -0.014 -0.002 -0.071 0.008 -0.001 0.005 
  (0.98) (0.59) (0.03) (0.45) (-1.14) (-0.86) (-0.26) (1.21) (-1.28) (-1.02) (-1.44) (2.07)** (-0.56) (1.13) 
December 0.032 0.001 -0.036 0.022 0.016 -0.008 -0.102 0.024 -0.012 0.001 -0.117 0.010 -0.003 0.006 
 (1.32) (1.76)* (-0.77) (0.93) (1.39) (-0.74) (-1.94)* (3.03)*** (-1.60) (0.36) (-1.82)* (1.91)* (-1.80)* (1.06) 
 
